accompanied 'by a surprising lack of interest on the part of parliamentarians '. 7 Since then, successive Home Secretaries have been critical of how the HRA has been used by judges. 8 The former Prime Minister also expressed concerns about the operation of the HRA: 'We will need to look again at whether primary legislation is needed to address the issue of court rulings which overrule Government in a way that is inconsistent with other EU countries' interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights.' 9 The current Justice Secretary, Jack Straw -who, as Home Secretary, was responsible for introducing the HRArecently announced his 'great frustration' with the way the Act had been interpreted by the courts and promised to publish plans to 'rebalance' the legislation with new 'responsibilities' to obey the law and be loyal to the country. 10 Indeed, the Premiership of Gordon Brown has brought with it more discussion of constitutional amendment, including a plan towards replacing the HRA with a 'British Bill of Rights and Duties '. 11 Other members of the government have taken a more favourable view. In a government report on the implementation of the HRA the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, stated: 'The impact of the Human Rights Act upon the development of UK law has been significantly less, and significantly less negative, than some predictions made for it from 1997 onwards.' 12 For the press, The Sun, Britain's bestselling newspaper, launched a campaign to repeal the HRA in light of 'judges' barmy rulings where a criminal's so-called rights come ahead of their victim's', 13 and the Editor of the Daily Mail commented before the House of Lords Constitution Committee: 'the Human Rights Act is placing judges in a position where they are making more and more contentious decisions which fly in the face of views of politicians and the general populace, … the demand for judges to be accountable is going to grow'. 14 The debate over the impact of the HRA is vibrant, then, and multidimensional. But it has lacked a sufficiently rigorous empirical dimension. Normative positions and claims are underpinned in part by assumptions about the way the HRA is currently being applied by the courts. But these assumptions have yet to be measured against systematic empirical data. This is not to say that there has been no such analysis. Klug's three 'snapshots' of the operation of the HRA in its early years provided analyses of some of the cases, but was not systematic (and in any case now not up to date). 15 Nicol's analysis from roughly the same period concentrates on the political and Parliamentary dimensions of the HRA, 16 whereas Sunkin's study of the effect of the HRA on the incidence of litigation against public bodies covered only the first 5 months of the Act's operation. 17 A more recent study of decision-making in the House of Lords by Dickson is more relevant, but neither systematic nor quantitative. 18 Many of the more significant studies have been published outside the law journals. Goold, Lazarus and Swiney compiled a comparative survey of the HRA for the Ministry of Justice, covering the ECHR, Germany, France and Spain in addition to the UK, but which only focussed on proportionality and the issue of 'balancing' rights and security. 19 Raine and Walker studied the early effects of the HRA for the Lord Chancellor's Department. However, their report -which dealt with the period 2000-02 -is outdated. 20 Equally, the Public Law Project's study of the impact of the HRA, 21 while certainly systematic, is limited to the study only of judicial review applications over a 6-month period in 2002. 22 And the Department of Constitutional Affairs' own review of the implementation of the HRA adopts a case study (non-quantitative) approach which is neither comprehensive nor systematic. 23 There are many reasons for thinking that a rigorous empirical analysis of the judicial caseload in the period preceding and postdating the introduction of the HRA might be particularly valuable at this juncture. The HRA is now in its 'adolescent stage', neither entirely young nor yet fully mature. Detailed case studies of the type that pervade the debate on the HRA should be supplemented with quantitative evidence of a systematic nature. 'Anecdote will no longer do.' 24 Scholars and other commentators are not in a position to make assumptions about how the courts are using the Act on the basis of how 'things have always been done'. At the same time, there has been sufficient practice to allow us to identify with reasonable confidence the trends that might arise from the analysis. In this respect, we have an advantage over earlier empirical studies of the Act.
The House of Lords is a worthy object of inquiry. Highest courts are regularly the subject of empirical analysis in other jurisdictions. The Harvard Law Review has a tradition dating back to the 1920s of including statistical tables on the annual practices of the US Supreme Court. 25 More generally, quantitative analysis of judges and judging is currently a vibrant strand of legal (and political science) scholarship, as a slew of prominent new works attest. 26 The decisions of the High Court of Australia have been subject to jurimetric analysis in recent years. 27 The Supreme Court of Canada has received similar attention, 28 as has the German Federal Supreme Court. 29 There has been relatively little empirical work into the House of Lords, 30 however, and that work has not been primarily quantitative 31 nor addressed to the field of human rights.
Our research, since it examines only the House of Lords, cannot provide a comprehensive account of the impact of the HRA on the courts. The task of assessing the caseload of all courts in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is beyond the scope of the present study. Examining cases at one level is a manageable starting point and, as it has been suggested that 'the highest density of HRA cases is in the House of Lords', 32 our analysis should provide valuable insights. Moreover, the House of Lords, soon to become the Supreme Court, 33 is undergoing a process of major restructuring. Some commentators have suggested that the House of Lords has begun to refashion itself within the HRA framework as something approaching a constitutional or supreme court. 34 The present study also casts light upon the nature and scope of this development.
Our analysis provides additional data on which participants in these debates might draw. But there are limitations to this particular genre. The consistent application of a reasonably rigid methodology, the essence of statistical analysis of this sort, can present important information but not the whole picture. In particular, the quantitative method treats all decisions as having equal importance when in fact the significance of each decision varies. (Think, for instance, of the disproportionate significance of the Belmarsh case in the survey period. 35 ) It is important not to fall headlong into the 'reductionist trap' by privileging 'variables that can be measured with relative ease from the entire set' of House of Lords cases. 36 Although statistical analysis can ultimately do no more than 'provide a factual foundation on which other studies can build, qualify and elaborate', 37 some tentative conclusions will be drawn from the analysis.
THE STUDY
Four avenues of research were selected. Grants of leave to appeal were examined first. Leave to appeal can be granted either by a lower court (now rare in civil cases 38 39 An Appeal Committee is composed of three Law Lords. Decisions are usually based on the documentation entered by the petitioner in support of their application but in certain circumstances 'a point of law of general importance'. 40 The aim was to test for any increased willingness on the part of the Law Lords to hear appeals that raised human rights issues. Second, the judgments handed down during the sample period were tested for the incidence of human rights arguments. Third, the 'win rate' of these human rights arguments was assessed. Finding out how frequently human rights arguments met with success provides an indication of the substance of decisionmaking and thus of the HRA's real impact. Finally the caseload of the Privy Council was examined in a similar way in order to elicit a more complete picture of the activities of the institution that will soon become the Supreme Court.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
A database of petitions for leave to appeal to the House of Lords was compiled for the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2007. Compiling a dataset that included the six year period before the HRA came into force as well as the seven years that followed allows for the drawing of fairly robust conclusions. The data was drawn from the Minutes of Proceedings of the House of Lords. The Minutes record all decisions of the Appeal Committees that determine whether leave to appeal is to be granted. 41 Our analysis records all applications for leave to appeal in the sample period, as well as the Appeal Committees' decisions. Applications for leave to appeal are normally made by individual petitions, even when a case was heard at the lower level alongside others. This pattern is reflected in our statistics, which count each individual petition for leave.
The official Judicial Statistics were not used in this study. The Statistics are produced each year and analyse the work of Appeal Committees. But inconsistencies in these data have been noted; 42 these can be avoided by drawing directly on the original records. This means, of course, that there are some differences between our figures and those of the official Statistics.
respondents may be invited to provide written objections setting out their views on whether leave should be given and if this is not persuasive an oral hearing may be convened. In recent times two Appeal Committees have been convened to process petitions for leave to appeal. 40 'There is a multitude of reasons why, in a particular case, leave to appeal may be refused by an appeal committee. I shall not attempt to embark upon an exhaustive list for it would be impossible to do so. One reason may be that the particular case raises no question of general principle but turns upon its own facts. Another may be that the facts of the particular case are not suitable as a foundation for determining some question of general principle. Your Lordships' House is only able, in any given year, to hear and determine a limited number of cases and it is important for the evolution of the law as a whole that those cases should be carefully chosen': In re Wilson [1985] 2 W.L.R. 694,756 . 41 Minutes from June 1998 are published online at: http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld/ldminar.htm; for minutes prior to this Bound Volumes of Minutes held at the Parliamentary Archives were consulted. 42 Figure 1 reproduces graphically the data on the outcomes of petitions for leave to appeal. One general observation is that the number of petitions for leave to appeal has risen during the sample period. The total number of petitions entered in 1994 was 163. This rose steadily to a peak of 277 petitions in 2002. By the end of the sample period (2007) the number had decreased to 212. Despite this overall increase, the success rate of petitions has remained fairly constant during the period, with around 1 in 3 being granted leave to appeal. More pertinently for the purposes of the present inquiry, there was no substantial increase in the general success rate of petitions after the HRA came into force.
The subject matter of the petitions was examined next. Disregarding at this point petitions held inadmissible or withdrawn before a decision on leave could be taken, each petition was traced back to the lower court decision that prompted it and coded according to its subject matter. We used the following case classification: (a) human rights; (b) rights-related; (c) refugee; and (d) other.
These categories need some explanation. For the purposes of the study a 'human rights case' was one that involved discussion of a right protected by the HRA, an international human rights treaty (excluding cases concerning refugees which was given its own category -see below) such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture 1984 43 or the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 ('ECHR'), 44 or customary international human rights law. Cases were included in this category if the right was discussed by at least one judge. The category also includes cases where a rights issue was raised in argument but not mentioned in any judgment. 45 It also includes those cases in which the human rights issue was only a minor point or incidental to the central questions in the case. So, where the rights issue was only one question among many, 46 or only addressed in one judge's opinion, the case was classified as a human rights case.
The 'rights-related' category refers in this context to cases that raise civil liberties or equality issues in which there was no mention of human rights in any of the judgments. We went beyond Gearty's minimalist (and controversial) understanding of civil liberties as 'political freedoms that we must have available to us all if it is to be true to say of us that we live in a society that adheres to the principle of representative, or democratic government' 47 to include police powers, 48 detention, 49 fair trial 50 and criminal justice issues. 51 The 'refugee' category relates to cases concerning the rights and treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in which there was no mention of human rights in the judgments. The catch-all 'others' category includes all those cases that did not fall into the 'human rights', 'rights-related' or 'refugee' categories.
Although the categories are not mutually exclusive, cases were only coded as one type or another. Whenever a case could be coded as both 'human rights' and either 'rights-related' or 'refugee', it was considered to be a 'human rights' case. We recognise that this approach might lead to an over-counting of 'human rights' cases and thus to a possible over-accentuation of the importance of human rights. But our approach is not only a pragmatic solution to an intractable problem, since in practice cases do not fall neatly into pre-arranged categories, but also justified given that our primary concerns relate to the both the incidence of human rights cases as well as the willingness of the House of Lords to hear cases with a human rights element. Given this aim, under-counting rights would be a greater sin than over-counting them.
The results are presented below. Table 1 provides a breakdown of petitions for leave to appeal (excluding those that were withdrawn) made to the House of Lords during the period of study. A preliminary issue to note is that some petitions could not be traced back to the lower court decision since not all such 44 See, e.g., the pre-HRA case R decisions are reported. These petitions were recorded as untraceable. They account for no more than 5% of all petitions made in any given year. Dickson observes in his study of the House of Lords that there appears to be no systematic procedure by which petitions are given leave to appeal. 52 Nor is there any authoritative elaboration of the only criterion upon which an Appeals Committee decides to grant leave: the presence of 'an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House at this time'. But a number of pertinent observations can be made. The incidence of human rights petitions increased very substantially after the HRA came into force. 'Rights-related' petitions, by contrast, remained fairly constant over the period. The incidence of other petitions decreased substantially (from an average of 169 petitions per year to one of 147 per year after the introduction of the Act). Unfortunately, the results cannot say definitively to what extent this realignment was due to a surge in 'genuine' new human rights cases or a post-HRA 'repackaging' of claims that would otherwise have been argued on other grounds. They do show, however, that there has been no discernible trend in respect of petitions concerning 'refugee' cases. While the incidence of such cases varies widely across the course of the survey, there is no indication that the introduction of the HRA has led to an increase in petitions for leave to appeal in respect of this category of case. The data concerning the success rate of different types of petition is revealing. The relevant data is presented graphically in Figure 2 . The success rate of human rights petitions has increased substantially since the HRA came into force. (There was a spike in 2000, when 91% of human rights petitions were granted leave. But one might also note the dip in 2006, where the success rate was only 28%.) The success rate for 'rights-related' petitions remained fairly constant over the course of our sample period. Roughly 1 in 3 of such petitions tends to be granted leave. (Although one might note the spike in the three years preceding the introduction of the HRA.) Success rates for other types of case remained fairly constant, with a similar success rate of around 1 in 3.
Figure 2: Success Rate for Petitions for Leave to A ppeal by Type
A different way of presenting the data concerning the success of leave to appeal petitions is to use aggregates of successful petitions. By setting the numbers from a pre-HRA period (say, 1996-9) against those from a post-HRA period (say, 2003-6) rounds off any 'spikes' or 'troughs' in the data and can reveal more clearly the changes that have taken place. What we are most interested in here are trends in human rights and rights-related petitions. For the selected periods, as Table 2 reveals, the total number of successful rights-related petitions is somewhat lower in the later period than the earlier (25 in 2003-6 compared with 35 in 1996-9) . But there is a very substantial difference in the number of successful human rights petitions -only 9 in 1996-9 compared with 89 in 2003-6. To complete this section of the study, we also coded the appeals to the House of Lords granted by lower courts. 53 There has been a dramatic decrease in the number of such grants of appeal, 54 a trend that has left a dataset too small to allow the drawing of any solid conclusions. (Although what this category of case lacks in quantity it makes up for in quality: many of the referrals from lower courts produced seminal HRA cases. 55 ) In as much as they indicate anything, the trends in these cases match those observed in the petitions for leave (more human rights cases; consistent numbers of rights-related and refugee cases; fewer 'other' cases).
The results are presented in Table 3 . So what does this study of the 'threshold' dimension of the House of Lords' business reveal? The numbers of petitions received annually by the House of Lords have gone up slightly during the sample period. Since there has been no change in the general success rate of leave petitions, the House of Lords has become a slightly busier court (even taking into account the drop in referrals of cases from lower courts). The influence of the HRA becomes more apparent when we turn to the subject-matter of the petitions. The figures show that there has been a very substantial increase in the number of human rights petitions that are allowed. (The aggregate figures show this finding in a particularly striking way.) And it is not just that the House of Lords now receives many more petitions of this sort -although this is part of the picture. It is also a matter of deliberate selection, since our figures show that human rights petitions are more likely to be allowed than other categories of case (including those that fall within the 'rightsrelated' category). Post-HRA, then, the Law Lords seem keen to hear human rights cases. This may relate to the recognition of a responsibility to make sense of the new legal framework and to give lower courts guidance on how to interpret and apply it. But, whatever the motivation, it has important implications for the character of the court. The number of human rights cases being heard has shot up and the number of rights-related cases has remained fairly steady (even on our coding which, for reasons already given, tends to prioritise human rights cases). There is, then, no strong indication that there has been a great deal of repackaging of civil liberties (and similar) cases in terms of human rights. The net result is a court with a far more pronounced public law profile than it did pre-HRA -human rights and rights-related cases then amounted to around 20% of the petitions given leave; now they account for 40%.
HOUSE OF LORDS' JUDGMENTS
The judgments of the House of Lords were examined next. A database of judgments handed down between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 2007 was compiled using the House of Lords' own website wherever possible. 56 Unfortunately that website only contains judgments from mid-November 1996 so for the preceding period the Weekly Law Reports was used as the primary source. It is worth noting that the database records final judgments delivered rather than individual appeals disposed of -some cases are conjoined appeals in which only one judgment is delivered. For instance, only one judgment was given in Sheldrake v DPP; Attorney-General's Reference (No. 4 of 2002) 57 although that case counted in our leave to appeal figures as two separate appeals, one granted by the lower court and one granted by the House of Lords. The same coding categories (human rights; rights-related; refugee; and other) were deployed as before. The analysis of the caseload of the House of Lords is reproduced in Table 4 and Table 5 . Table 4 contains the total numbers of judgments delivered by the House of Lords in the period in question. The incidence of each type of case ('human rights', 'rights-related', 'refugee' and 'others') is given. For a clearer demonstration of the breakdown of the caseload, the absolute figures for each type of case are listed as a percentage of the total caseload in Table 5 . Second, the figures show a substantial rise in human rights cases from an average of around 2 per year in the years before the HRA to an average of 17 per year in post-HRA years. Naturally, one would have expected the number of human rights cases to increase after the HRA came into force as a new ground for litigation was introduced. What is perhaps more striking is the proportion of the House of Lords' caseload that human rights cases now account for. As a percentage of total caseload, human rights cases increased from around 4% before the introduction of the Act to around 28% thereafter. Although there is a significant downturn in the number of human rights cases decided in 2006 (less than half the number in 2005, a 'bumper' year for human rights litigation in the House of Lords), this does not appear to presage a general decline: there was an increase from 13 cases in 2006 to 18 cases in 2007.
Third, there was a slight downturn in the number of rights-related cases over the sample period. The Lords decided on average 8 rights-related cases per annum (14% of their total caseload) before the HRA came into force; and around 6 per annum (9% of the caseload) in the following years. This marginal decline does not seem to support the 'repackaging thesis' -that matters presented as rights-related cases pre-HRA have been turned into human rights cases post-HRA -although it is not possible given our methodology to say anything more definitive on this issue. As Figure 4 illustrates, the rights-related category remains pretty robust while the human rights category shows a sharp increase. If anything, the rapid expansion of human rights cases coincides more clearly with a moderate decrease in the number of 'other' cases dealt with combined with the overall increase in the total number of judgments already noted.
Figure 4: H ouse of Lords' Judgments by Category
The incidence of 'refugee' (immigration and asylum) cases was also examined. This was done in part because previous empirical studies have shown that such cases often form a high proportion of (judicial review) cases, 58 but also because this type of case receives considerable (and often critical) attention in the public discourse on the HRA. The figures show that over the period in question there were between 1 and 2 such cases per year (around 2% of the total caseload). However, this does not include those cases that concerned refugee issues but which also referred to human rights and were as such coded as 'human rights' cases. There were 9 of these cases, 59 all post-HRA. These account for around 7% of all 'human rights' cases heard since October 2000. Taking all refugee cases into account, refugee cases constitute around 4% of the post-HRA caseload compared with around 2% of the pre-HRA caseload. While this increase is not entirely insignificant, we can conclude that the very substantial rise in the incidence of human rights cases since the HRA -and the substantial rise in the overall caseload of the House of Lords during the same period -is not due to an increase in the numbers of cases concerning asylum and immigration matters.
'WIN' RATES
The success of 'human rights' and 'rights-related' cases in the House of Lords was examined next. The relevant judgments were coded as a 'win' or 'loss' depending on whether the human rights or rights-related claim met with success. Only where the substantive claim was upheld was the case coded as a 'win'. (Note that it is only possible to test human rights and rights-related cases in this way -and not for instance the cases that fell within the 'other' category -since what we are testing for is the success of human rights (and rights-related) arguments; not of individual applicants or appellants.) Where there were two 'rights' issues in a case in which the outcome differed for each, or conjoined appeals where the outcome in each appeal differed due to the particular facts of the case, 60 the successful claim prevailed and the case was coded as a 'win'. In order to establish the 'win rate' of human rights and rights-related claims, the number of 'wins' in a particular category was divided by the total number of cases in that category. 61 The findings are collated in Table 6 and Table 7 . There are a number of points to be drawn from these data. Turning first to 'wins' in human rights cases, the figures show that there were relatively few human rights wins before the HRA came into force. Human rights claims won in only 5 out of a total of 13 pre-HRA cases (admittedly a small sample). Of 132 post-HRA cases involving human rights claims, 35 were successful. The win rate for human rights cases in post-HRA years ranges from 0% to around 40% in any given year (see Figure 5 ). In other words, human rights cases have not had a very high win rate in the House of Lords. On average, only one in three human rights claims is successful.
Figure 5: W ins/ Losses in H uman Rights Cases
The low win rate for human rights cases is more striking when set against the figures for rights-related cases. There was little appreciable difference in the win rate of rights-related cases before and after the HRA came into force (see Figure 6 ). Since October 2000, there have been fewer rights-related than human rights cases, but their win rate is substantially higher. Before the HRA came into force, rightsrelated claims won in 19 out of 49 cases. The average win rate for these claims was around 40% -the upper limit for the win rates of human rights claims. Post-HRA, the win rate in rights-related cases is still higher -21 out of 41 claims (or 54%) won. In other words, just over half of rights-related claims brought before the House of Lords post-HRA have been successful.
Figure 6: W ins/ Losses in Rights-Related Cases
What is going on here? We noted in the previous section an increased willingness on the part of the Law Lords to hear human rights cases. But now we find that the win rate in such cases tends to be low -and certainly significantly lower than for rights-related cases. It seems that while the Lords are more willing to hear human rights cases than other types of case, they are more inclined to dismiss them than the other cases they hear. There are a number of possible explanations for this pattern. One (fairly prosaic) explanation might be that the Lords have not yet worked out a sufficiently rigorous mechanism by which weak human rights cases might be filtered out at the petition for leave stage -an understandable state of affairs given the novelty of much of the law being applied. Another explanation might be that while the Law Lords are interested in ruling on human rights claims, they are not so sympathetic to the substance of human rights claims. (They may even be taking up some of these cases in order to rule against them.) In either event, the lack of success of human rights cases at this level may have an impact upon the viability of the 'repackaging' thesis noted above, since it appears to undercut the incentive towards dressing up an argument in terms of human rights.
THE PRIVY COUNCIL
The new UK Supreme Court will assume the powers of the current Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the devolution jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. To complete this study, then, the Privy Council's decisions on devolution matters were examined. All three devolution statutes give the Privy Council appellate jurisdiction in devolution matters. One ground of appeal exists where a devolved authority is alleged to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the HRA. 62 A database of Privy Council judgments and win rates in human rights cases was constructed in the same manner as for the House of Lords.
Figure 7: Privy Council Judgments
We found that all the devolution cases heard so far by the Privy Council have raised questions about human rights. Figure 7 shows the total number of devolution cases heard by the Privy Council in the survey period and the number of cases where the human rights argument won. Save for a relatively high incidence of cases in 2001 and 2002, there are generally only about 2 such cases per year. The win rate for human rights arguments in Privy Council decisions is very low: 5 out of 23 cases -a win rate of around 22%. Although the small sample size makes the drawing of meaningful comparisons problematic, this figure compares unfavourably with the (in any case low) win rate of human rights cases decided by the House of Lords.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Care is needed when drawing conclusions from studies of this sort. Statistical analyses, revealing though they can be, often work best as platforms from which other studies can build. The general limitations of the method are compounded here by the fact that the present study relates only to the House of Lords, which means that it would be wrong to use these results as a basis from which to extrapolate freely about the impact of the HRA. The study's findings speak directly to trends within the House of Lords; they offer at best only indirect evidence for the impact of the HRA on the courts more generally. These caveats notwithstanding, the study gives rise to a number of important findings. The analysis of petitions for leave to appeal from the sample period (1 January 1994 to 31 December 2007) shows that the House of Lords has become a steadily busier court. The HRA may have had some impact on this trend, since the Lords have shown themselves particularly willing to grant leave to human rights cases since the Act came into force. Not only has there been a substantial post-HRA increase in petitions that raise human rights arguments; but the success rate of such petitions has also been high -substantially higher indeed than for other categories of case (including rights-related cases). This last finding indicates deliberate selection -the Lords seem keen to hear human rights cases.
The analysis of House of Lords' judgments also produced interesting results. It revealed, predictably enough, a very significant post-HRA increase in the incidence of human rights cases. (There is little indication, incidentally, that this process is about to be reversed. The 'teething process thesis' -which would predict that, after a period of activity during which the boundaries of the HRA were tested, the number of human rights claims should decline -is not supported by the evidence.) We also discovered, somewhat less predictably, that there had been no corresponding drop in the numbers of rights-related cases. This finding speaks against strong versions of the 'repackaging thesis' which predicts that many cases previously argued in terms of civil liberties (or similar) would be argued as human rights cases after the HRA came into force. 63 The analysis does not indicate such a wholesale translation of old-style, common law grounds into the language of human rights, but rather the co-existence of both types of argument.
Asylum and immigration cases tend to receive much attention in the public debate on the HRA. A poll conducted for the Ministry of Justice found that 43% of the public believe that 'too many people (mostly asylum seekers and other 'foreigners') take advantage of the Human Rights Act'. 64 The evidence indicates that at least in respect of the decision-making of the UK's highest court this perception is largely ungrounded. Only 9 of 132 post-HRA human rights cases 63 Particularly as 'the courts must, so far as possible, declare the common law in a way compatible with Convention rights, just as they must, so far as is possible, interpret and give effect to legislation in that way', Lord Lester and K. A more interesting feature of the statistics on judgments is the low win rate for human rights cases. Only one in three of these cases win in the House of Lords. This win rate is significantly lower than that of rights-related cases (about one in two). This finding complicates the picture derived from the analysis of the leave petitions, where human rights tended to be more rather than less successful relative to other types of case. One reason for this pattern might be that the Law Lords have yet to identify a suitable filtering mechanism to deal with this new body of law. A more likely explanation is that while the Lords may be keen on hearing human rights cases, they are not particularly sympathetic in general to human rights claims. The hovering presence of the European Court of Human Rights may also be having an impact on case selection. The Lords may be opting to deal with human rights cases 'in house' wherever possible, in part so that they can show in future challenges before the Strasbourg Court that human rights cases have been subject to intelligent analysis at the highest domestic level.
The evidence also speaks to the changing nature of the House of Lords. The data on leave petitions paint a picture of a busier court, more inclined to devote attention to the public law dimensions of its work. This impression is largely confirmed by the figures on actual decisions, which show that the House of Lords is now much more active on this front than it was before the HRA came into operation. If we combine human rights with rights-related and 'refugee' cases, public law issues (broadly defined) may be said to constitute some 42% of the caseload of the House of Lords, compared with 17% in the years before the Act came into force. This amounts to a profound shift in the practice of the court. Public law issues, it would appear, have moved from the periphery to the centre of the business of our highest court. Time will tell whether this trend will continue once the House of Lords has become the Supreme Court.
